Concise news summaries, often with the benefit of at least 24 hours of hindsight
THE BALTIC SEA in recent years has become a place where everything converges: climate goals, economic ambitions, environmental protection, fishing, shipping and—more and more—security. Offshore wind energy for Latvia is not just a story about “green” electricity. It is a choice about what kind of Baltic Sea we want to see: will it be a space for our energy independence, security and innovation, or a territory of disputes, concerns and uncertainty?
According to the latest insights from the LIAA survey, conducted in February in collaboration with the sociological research firm Norstat, there is already a solid foundation for a conversation about offshore wind-energy development.
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A convincing majority (70%) of the Latvian public considers the sea a suitable location for wind farms, and national energy independence remains a top priority (84%). In fact, the key question is no longer whether wind energy is beneficial, but rather how we can implement it safely and intelligently, ensuring that coastal residents and the country as a whole benefit from it.
Professionals also revisit this “how” once a year in dedicated discussions; for example, in the programme of the WindWorks 2026 conference, the security dimension was highlighted explicitly: how to protect critical energy infrastructure in the Baltics, and what to expect in terms of cybersecurity threats.
The planned Latvian-Estonian wind farm ELWIND is not an isolated object. It will become part of a system consisting of subsea cables, substations, communication solutions, maritime traffic safety monitoring, remote control, data exchange and many other components. In other words, it is a network of critical infrastructure whose vulnerability in Europe has, in recent years, become an open and publicly acknowledged fact.
That is precisely why tangible steps have already been taken at the European level to treat underwater infrastructure not merely as an engineering solution, but also as a significant security issue. In 2024, the European Commission published recommendations for the security of submarine cables, emphasising co-ordination, governance and funding measures to mitigate risks to these connections that are vital for global communications. Meanwhile, in 2023, NATO established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell to strengthen co-operation with industry, promote the exchange of best practices and enhance defence capabilities.
Security is not an abstract concept in Latvia either. In April 2024, the energy ministers of eight Baltic Sea countries agreed the Vilnius Declaration, which provides for closer co-operation in strengthening the security of critical offshore energy infrastructure. This agreement was reached at a time when concerns in the region had increased over attacks and acts of sabotage, which have highlighted the vulnerability of infrastructure.
In the current context of geopolitical tension, energy security has shifted from a theoretical concept to a matter of everyday costs and resilience. Even minor disruptions in supply chains are enough for global price increases to impact inflation in Latvia. This is clearly reflected in the recent situation in the oil market. Crude oil prices have risen, while the European gas market remains volatile.
HOW DOES WIND ENERGY FIT INTO THIS CONTEXT?
In the event of unpredictable developments, imported fuel quickly becomes a significant risk to household budgets. Under these conditions, electrification and domestic renewable-energy sources take on strategic importance. The greater the share of consumption that can be shifted to electricity, and the more of it we produce ourselves (using wind, solar and other renewable resources), the less dependent we are on external disruptions, and the more stable and predictable energy bills become.
Excessive dependence on a limited number of electricity sources is a significant risk we cannot afford. Wind energy enables diversification of the energy-production structure; therefore, security and maritime spatial planning dimensions must be integrated from the very beginning of a project, rather than added later as an afterthought.
When designing such facilities, potential incident scenarios and response plans must be anticipated in advance, cybersecurity requirements should be included as a mandatory technical baseline, and maritime spatial planning must be carried out in a way that balances security and defence interests with the needs of energy, fisheries and environmental protection. With this approach, the ELWIND can become a reliable and resilient part of critical infrastructure.
Job creation, local business development, investment in infrastructure, as well as growth in science and research are among the most frequently cited benefits of offshore wind energy. Although approximately 70% of the population considers the sea a suitable location for wind-farm development, people still have questions about their potential impact on the landscape, biodiversity and restrictions on fishing, kitesurfing and shipping. Often, people’s perceptions are dominated by the image of wind turbines alone, rather than the broader scope of economic activity and overall benefits they can bring.
RELATED ARTICLE } Intertwined, under attack and in need of protection
The development of offshore wind creates opportunities for the emergence of new coastal industries and competencies. It encompasses a wide range of maritime-related activities—from energy production to the use of water resources and coastal tourism—while simultaneously fostering the development of new technologies, skills and services. From this perspective, offshore wind can become a significant platform that generates jobs in coastal areas and promotes innovation.
In Europe, this platform approach is increasingly manifesting as multi-functional solutions, for example, seaweed farming within wind farm zones. In the Netherlands, as part of the North Sea Farmers project at the Hollandse Kust Zuid wind farm, located approximately 18 kilometers offshore, commercial-scale seaweed cultivation has been established, while simultaneously researching biodiversity and carbon-sequestration opportunities. Meanwhile, the Ecowende wind farm, another Dutch project, is being created as one of the most environmentally friendly projects of its kind, where all activities and technical solutions are aligned with nature-conservation principles.
These examples lead to a vital conclusion: a wind farm is not a closed or restrictive zone; it can become a space for innovation, where research, services and coastal entrepreneurship develop simultaneously. In fact, it is part of the solution for preserving local communities and encouraging the younger generation to settle in coastal areas.
For Latvia, this perspective is particularly significant, as it offers coastal cities and ports the opportunity to transform from infrastructure peripheries into regional centers of competence. In practice, harnessing offshore wind energy means strengthening port capacities, developing logistics, vessel servicing, cable infrastructure, service and repair bases, as well as training opportunities. If this phase is not developed, the greatest added value flows elsewhere. Conversely, by developing it, coastal residents gain jobs, knowledge and business opportunities.
COEXISTENCE AT SEA
The survey mentioned above shows that public awareness in Latvia about wind-farm initiatives and energy-security issues is gradually increasing; however, a large part of the public still remains at the level of “I have heard about it” or “hard to say”. This lack of information creates fertile ground for rumour, resistance and politically motivated fluctuations during pre-election periods.
If we want to build an inspiring yet honest narrative, we must state clearly: ELWIND will only be successful if the discussion about it is framed in terms of security, economic development and public trust. To achieve this, simple and understandable principles are needed: fewer general slogans and more clear answers on the essentials (where the project will be located? why specifically there? what the benefits and risks will be? what compensation and benefit-sharing mechanisms are planned? and how nature and security protection will be ensured?)
Communication should follow an approach in which coastal residents are perceived as beneficiaries rather than obstacles. Latvia’s task is not to prove that wind energy is good; Latvia’s task is to demonstrate that it can be implemented safely, with added value for the economy, and through a process that the public can trust.
The author is the head of the ELWIND project division for the Investment and Development Agency of Latvia (LIAA).
Originally published by LIAA.
THE BALTIC SEA region has built one of the world’s most interconnected and dynamic areas, bound together by trade, energy, digital infrastructure and a shared maritime environment. But the pressures bearing down on the region today require something more than connectivity. They require resilience.
Geopolitical tension on Europe’s eastern flank, accelerating climate stress on the Baltic Sea ecosystem, demographic shifts across the region and hybrid threats targeting critical infrastructure do not respect national borders. They cannot be solved by any single country, economic sector or level of government acting alone.
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Tallinn hosts the 17th EUSBSR Annual Forum on 11-13 May 2026 at Tallinn Creative Hub, bringing together over 500 policymakers, municipal representatives, researchers, businesspeople and civil-society representatives from across the Baltic Sea region to turn strategy into action. The aim of the Annual Forum is to translate regional co-operation into concrete action.
Resilience in this context means more than crisis response or military preparedness, though both matter. It means energy systems robust enough to withstand disruption, transport and digital networks that hold under pressure, economies competitive enough to attract investment and talent and institutions trusted enough that societies stay coherent when tested. It also means coastal and marine ecosystems healthy enough to sustain the communities that depend on them. As Tõnis Nirk, chair of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region National Co-ordinators Group, has put it: resilience in the Baltic Sea region means more than withstanding shocks—it means thriving through them by building the capacity to adapt and collaborate in an era where crises are becoming the new normal.
Cities and regions sit at the centre of all of this. When a crisis hits, whether a flood, a cyberattack or a supply-chain collapse, it is local and regional authorities that respond first. They manage infrastructure, deliver essential services and maintain the community trust that resilience depends on. Their co-operation across the Baltic Sea region is not peripheral. It is foundational.
CO-OPERATION AS THE ANSWER
This is also where the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region demonstrates its purpose. Since 2009, the strategy has connected policies, funding programmes and stakeholders across countries and sectors, turning individual projects into long-term solutions. The newly updated Action Plan (2026, pending European Commission approval), the result of over 100 ministries, national agencies and EU institutions working toward a shared roadmap, reflects a clear shift: member states have placed resilience at the centre of transnational co-operation in the Baltic Sea region.
The experience of 17 years of co-operation shows that the better the region works together across borders, levels and sectors, the stronger it becomes. That is not a platitude. It is the architecture behind a strategy that has shaped how eight EU member states address their most complex shared challenges.
The author is the International PR and Global Visibility Co-ordinator for the city of Tallinn.
Originally published by the city of Tallinn.
When they meet in Oslo tomorrow, the 87 delegates to the Nordic Council, a gathering of legislators from the region, will be asking each other if they are ready for the next crisis.
Strictly speaking, issues like foreign affairs, defence and security are not within the remit of the Nordic Council. The fact that its semi-annual session will again have the issue on its agenda anyway reflects two things: one, the pressing nature of the matter, and, two, the region’s growing reliance on a strategy known as “total defence”.
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Since the start of Moscow’s unprovoked war against Ukraine, the Nordic and Baltic countries, fearing they are next, have been pumping a lot of money into their militaries, with Denmark’s prime minister going so far as to order the country’s generals to go on a shopping spree.
Total defence makes that spending go a little further by giving the private sector and ordinary civilians a role to play during times of crisis—at a minimum, by making sure they can take care of themselves, so that the public sector and the military can concentrate on the most immediate threats. The thinking is that involving populations in emergency preparedness means they know what to do in the event something happens, and, not least, how to get themselves ready for it. Call it prepping, Nordic style.
FURTHER READING
} Nordic-Baltic Total Defence: Easier Said Than Done (Heinrich Böll Stiftung)
} Lithuanian opposition presents alternative defence plan, calling for total defence concept (LRT)
} Strengthening civil preparedness in the Baltic Sea Region (Diis)
} Focus on preparedness and total defence when Presidium of the Nordic Council met in Iceland (Nordic Council)
} “Finns understand that everyone has a role to play” (Helsinki Security Forum)
} Nordic Council Theme Session 2026 (Nordic Council)
} Total defence (Government offices of Sweden)
} A new era for Nordic security and preparedness (Nordic Council)
As far as building 100km bridges go, spanning the Kvarken, a narrowing of the northern Gulf of Bothnia, would be an easy task. Thanks to relatively shallow water, a generally firm seabed and an archipelago on the Finnish side, the challenge would lie less in getting the thing built than it would with coming up with the billions euros it would cost. (Estimates range from €5bn to €100bn.)
For that reason, when the idea has come up in the past, it has been easy for lawmakers in Sweden and in Finland to dismiss it as a costly white elephant that would have little benefit compared with the existing ferry service.
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These days, though, the calculus that drives the cost-benefit analyses of such projects has a new variable: security. Where the idea of a better-connected region has long been framed in economic terms, a bridge across the Kvarken is increasingly being discussed as a way for Finns to remain connected to Europe in the event Russian shenanigans render the Finnish-Swedish land border unusable.
For now, a Kvarken bridge remains well over the horizon: a report published last year by Finland’s transport ministry reckons that the earliest one could be open for traffic would be the early 2040s. Still, proponents are bullish: the same report found a bridge was technically feasible and laid the foundation for an assessment of its economic benefits. A journey of a hundred kilometres begins with a single report.
FURTHER READING
} Fixed link across the Kvarken discussed in the Swedish Parliament (Kvarkenrådet)
} The €30-billion bid to link Finland to the wider EU (The Parliament)
} Finland wants to build a bridge across the Baltic Sea to Sweden for better connections to Europe (Euronews)
} Huge bridge between Sweden and Finland back on the drawing board (Ingeniøren)
} Kvarken Fixed Connection Feasibility Study (Väylävirasto)
A temporary reduction in the value-added tax on food items takes effect in Sweden today. As part of an 80 billion kronor (€7.35 billion) package passed in September aimed at supporting households and the economy, particularly in response to rising food prices and inflation, Swedes will pay 6% on retail food items until the end of 2027. (To the ire of restaurateurs, the VAT on prepared foods eaten on premises will remain at 12%.)
For the average family, the savings are expected to add up to 6,500 kronor (€594) per year, and the hope among the lawmakers who agreed on the reduction is that voters will remember where the money came from when they go to the polls later this year. But with an annual median income in the neighbourhood of 400,000 kronor, Swedes will be more concerned that the reduction will be paid for by reduced spending on other programmes.
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Rising fuel prices stemming from the closing of the Strait of Hormuz also threaten eat up any savings at the supermarket. But there is a tax cut for that too: starting on 1 May, the government will reduce fuel duties to the EU minimum, in effect, extending until September a reduction that has been in place since 2022.
Note: This article originally incorrectly stated that all prepared foods will continue be assessed a 12% VAT. Sorry.
FURTHER READING
} Sweden to temporarily halve food VAT in election-year budget (Reuters)
} Sweden: VAT for food is lowered (Nordea)
} Sweden’s gasoline tax cuts make driving cheaper — but at what cost? (Stockholm School of Economics)
} Sweden’s government to cut taxes on petrol and diesel (Svergies Radio)
Moscow has resumed shipments of crude oil from two Baltic Sea ports near St Petersburg after a drone attack damaged a loading facility at Primorsk on Sunday. A second facility, at Ust-Luga, was closed as a precaution but re-opened after authorities lifted an attack alert. The two ports are major outlets for Russian oil, and the attack was a part of Ukraine’s strategy of targeting oil refineries in order to disrupt Moscow’s war economy.
Countries of the Baltic Sea region would like to see traffic to and from Primorsk and Ust-Luga stopped as well—for the added reason that the 1,000 or so ships that Russia uses to transport the oil and other banned items are not seaworthy, and they fear they will cause an accident. They are also suspected of being used by Moscow to sabotage undersea infrastructure.
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But where Ukraine has the option of sending drones to accomplish its goals, Baltic Sea countries have had to tread more carefully for fear of provoking the Kremlin. That meant only stepping in when vessels posed an imminent danger, or when they were suspected of causing damage.
Now, though, their coast guards are becoming increasingly proactive. The Swedish coast guard, for example, boarded two vessels in a single week earlier this month. In one of the incidents, the captain was detained for “violating maritime code and the ship safety act, as well as the use of a forged document”. Those are hardly fighting words—but that is precisely the point.
A delegation of more than 100 representatives from Sweden, led by the country’s king, wrapped up a three-day visit to Poland on Wednesday that was focused on deepening security and economic co-operation between the two countries.
The visit comes as Stockholm and Warsaw are assembling defence forces that Moscow would think twice about tangling with. Both have shown that they can keep low-intensity harassment in the Baltic in check, but the bigger concern is whether they would be able to prevent a Russian land grab, and whether they could do so independent of American help.
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A Polish-Swedish partnership is a match made in military-industrial heaven. Concerned that it does not have the modern kit needed to pose a credible deterrence, Poland is spending half of its defence budget—per capita the largest in Nato—on new equipment. That is more money than it can spend at home, and it has made Poland one of the biggest markets for Swedish arms exporters.
Saab’s sales of big-ticket items account for much of that, but there is plenty of potential for smaller firms to get in on the act, according to Business Sweden, a lobby group. It reckons that there are some 380 companies—many of them small and medium-sized—involved directly in arms production, and that vastly more making the civilian technologies that go into weapons. Modern warfare is good business for ploughshares that can be used as swords.
The eight Nato countries bordering the Baltic Sea, together with Iceland and Norway, have pledged to open their borders to each other’s citizens should they be forced to flee in the event of a disaster. The agreement is an extension of a patchwork of arrangements among some of the countries in the region and will make it possible to co-ordinate responses and establish uniform procedures for doing so.
The bear not in the room is Russia. The Kremlin has repeatedly said that it does not intend to invade Nato countries, but western intelligence agencies have advised their governments to be ready for everything from small-scale shenanigans to an outright invasion. Military collaboration has long been a way to signal to their populations that they are doing what they can to prevent such things from happening. Now, civil-defence agencies are showing they will be taken care of in the event they do.
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The leading opposition party standing in Denmark’s general election on 24 March is suggesting that the 61 billion kroner (€816 million) in subsidies pledged by the Danish state last month to build Bornholm Energy Island would be better spent supporting the development of atomic power.
The proposal, put forward by Alex Vanopslagh, the leader of the Liberal Alliance, calls for taking a total of 120 billion kroner in subsidies for renewable-power projects and using the money fund construction of as many as eight atomic-energy plants over the next 15 years.
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Though Bornholm Energy Island, which encompasses two offshore windfarms and an onshore power converter, is a Danish project, Germany is its biggest benefactor: in exchange for footing 70% of the bill it will get most of the power the windfarms generate.
The setup is one that the Danes worked hard to sell to Berlin, and would make it hard for Mr Vanopslagh to make good on his proposal without Denmark losing face. This is something he is well aware of, suggesting the purpose of making it has more to do with promoting his party’s position that Denmark should overturn its ban on atomic energy than it does with sinking an energy island.
Denmark has reactivated an air-force squadron that will operate four long-range drones to support surveillance of its interests in the Arctic, the North Atlantic and the Baltic.
The decision to purchase the American-produced MQ-9B SeaGuardians was announced last year, as was the three-year wait to have them delivered. But building up a drone corps in Denmark will take time as well; the air-force announced yesterday that it will need to hire and train a hundred or so people—many of them civilians—to keep the drones up and running.
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The drone purchase is being made with the blank cheque the government gave the military last year, when it ordered it to procure the materiel it deems necessary to scale up its capacity as quickly as possible. Drones, it appears, fit that bill nicely: the SeaGuardians join four saildrones that were sea-trialled in June in preparation for surveillance operations in the Baltic. Compared with crewed systems, the drones are cheap and quickly rolled out.
The saildrones are also American-made, however—a fact that does not sit well with those who would prefer that the military start buying more of its kit in Europe. Other European armies are stocking up on American arms too, though: Germany, Belgium and Poland are all buying SeaGuardians. The saildrones’ producer, for its part, has chosen to set up a European sales office in Copenhagen. Denmark is unlikely to be the last country American drones take over.