Intertwined, under attack and in need of protection

This looks like a job for Nato

ANALYSIS | The Baltic Sea has been a centre of maritime trade for thousands of years. The countries in the region continue that tradition, expanding beyond maritime operations to include rail, energy and communications infrastructure. However, the project remains incomplete and under attack. The countries of the region, the EU and other bodies must generate the resources and the political will to finish building and defending this infrastructure.

In December, the US Congressional Helsinki Commission mapped nearly 150 Russian operations since February 2022. They are designed to stay below the threshold that would allow for a military response and are part of the Russian campaign to destabilise Europe, diminish support for Ukraine and undermine organisations like the EU and Nato. Of these operations, some 33% were directed against critical infrastructure, and many were focused on the Baltic region. 

Maritime transportation infrastructure is very well developed in the Baltic Sea, however Moscow’s large-scale jamming of navigation signals around the region has recently intensified, disrupting air and sea navigation and provoking the ire of the impacted countries. The effects of intermittent jamming by Russian electronic warfare equipment are felt from northern Norway to southern Poland. Additionally, the 2020 Maersk hacks (when Russian hacker group Sandworm released the NotPetya virus into the wild) showed, maritime transportation infrastructure is also vulnerable to cyber operations. 

It is impossible, however, to disaggregate maritime infrastructure from other transportation, energy and communications infrastructure. They are intimately intertwined, under attack and need protection.

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Although Sweden and Norway have rail projects designed to connect the west coast of Norway to the rest of Europe through Sweden, rail projects in the east remain underdeveloped. The EU and the Baltic states still need to finish Rail Baltica, extending European-gauge railroads from the Polish border to Tallinn. The West Railway in Finland is a partly double-tracked rail link between Helsinki and Turku, however Finland, Sweden the EU and Nato should consider double-tracking the rails from Helsinki to Luleå, in Sweden, and on to Narvik. This would link Finland to potential reinforcement through either Narvik or Trondheim. They should also consider resourcing the Helsinki-Tallinn railway tunnel, which would allow rail support to the Baltics if the Russians were to close the Suwałki Gap on the Polish-Lithuanian border, and to Finland if Moscow blocks rail links in central Finland.

Energy and communications infrastructure are well developed and under attack. In late 2024, ships the European Commission identified as being part of Russia’s “shadow fleet” cut the Lion1 cable between Finland and Germany, the Balticconnector gas pipeline, two data cables and the Estlink 2 undersea power cable, all connecting Finland and Estonia.

These operations targeting maritime traffic, communications and energy infrastructure require that the circum-Baltic states review and update their legal codes to increase the intensity and intrusiveness of their intelligence and police operations, as the Finnish government is doing. They should also examine using military assets in a defensive posture. Since the entire Baltic Sea comprises territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, domestic legal codes and international agreements make these types of security operations legal and appropriate. 

Another initiative would be creating a critical infrastructure common operating picture. Some organisations, such as the Joint Expeditionary Force and Nato, have already activated a system to track threats. Additionally, the EU, individual countries and Nato should build resilience into critical infrastructure to minimise the effect of Russian cyber and electronic warfare, as well as physical operations on regional critical infrastructure. The EU also needs to update its strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: although the objectives remain valid, the geopolitical situation has changed significantly, requiring a fresh approach. 

If the countries of the Baltic do not generate resources and political will and focus on critical infrastructure, Russian hybrid operations will generate internal friction and decrease regional economic activity, weakening European states at a critical time.

The author is a non-resident senior fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington, DC.